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We analyze the distribution and taxation of top incomes in Germany during the 1990s on the basis of 
individual tax returns data. We derive a measure of economic income from taxable gross income as 
reported in the tax returns. Thanks to complete sampling, we can deliver a very precise description of 
very high incomes, in terms of both distribution and composition by source. We also provide a meas-
ure of the effective average rate of taxation for various income groups. Our main findings are as fol-
lows: (i) incomes are highly concentrated in Germany, more than commonly thought; (ii) the German 
economic elite relies much less than elites in France or the US upon income from wages and salaries; 
(iii) income taxes are highly concentrated in Germany, more than commonly thought; (iv) although 
effective tax rates are significantly lower than statutory ones, the income tax is effectively progressive; 
(v) income taxation substantially reduces income inequality in Germany. 
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Despite partial retrenchment of the welfare state in many countries, the personal income tax is still 
regarded in advanced economies as the centrepiece of the tax system and an essential tool to reduce 
income inequality. However, things might look very different in a couple of years. Possibly, the in-
come tax might be replaced by a consumption tax in the long run. Alternatively, the progressivity of 
the personal income tax might be drastically reduced, e.g. by switching to a flat tax with a low tax rate, 
at least for capital income (“dual income tax”). 
In order to evaluate the reasons for abolishing, reforming, or retaining the income tax as it is, one has 
to empirically assess the actual contribution of that instrument to reduce income inequality. Firstly, 
that contribution depends on the distribution of market incomes. Having an enormous degree of tax 
progressivity may exert a negligible distributional impact if market incomes are rather equally distrib-
uted. Conversely, progressivity is the more valuable for equity reasons the more unequal the distribu-
tion of market incomes is. Secondly, the distributional benefits from the income tax depend on true 
progressivity, which is not only determined by the tax schedule but also by the pattern and the size of 
tax avoidance. Thus, a highly progressive tax schedule may turn out to be a quite ineffective tool to 
attain distributional aims if the relative amount of erosion of the tax base increases with income. 
In this paper, we examine the concentration of market incomes and the effectiveness of the personal 
income tax in the largest European economy, namely Germany. Our investigation is based on official 
tax statistics data at the individual level, accessed to through the Research Data Centre of the Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany. The data cover the period 1992-1998 and include 10 %-samples of the 
total taxpayer population in Germany. Noticeably, all German taxpayers that belong to the top percen-
tile of the income distribution are included in our data set. This distinctive trait enables us to deliver a 
picture of the German distribution of top incomes and top taxes that is much more precise than those 
obtainable from alternative sources, e.g. the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) or the German 
Income and Consumption Survey (EVS). 
We find that the distribution of income in Germany is more concentrated than commonly thought. The 
top decile of the income distribution receives about one third of total income of the taxpayer popula-
tion. Even excluding capital gains, the top 0.1 % of the German income distribution receives 4 % of 
total taxpayers’ income. 
Income levels and income concentration are quite astonishing in the case of the German economic 
elite. We define the elite as the top 0.001 % group of the taxpayer population. This group included less 
than 300 households, with an average income without capital gains of 22.3 million Euro in 1998. 
Roughly, in the German economic elite, a typical household earns as much as one thousand German 
worker households can earn together. 
German tax data show substantial variation across income groups with respect to the composition of 
their incomes. Wage income is by far the quantitatively most important income source for the vast 
majority of taxpayers. For the richest 1  % German households, income from capital and self-
employment viz. business is the dominant source. Strikingly, the predominance of capital income  
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seems to be much stronger in Germany than in the U.S. – as documented by Piketty and Saez (2003) – 
or even in France – as documented by Piketty (2003). Apparently, only about 1 % of the economic 
elite of Germany of the 1990s consisted of top managers. 
A large portion of our study is devoted to the distributional implications of the personal income tax. In 
Germany, the tax schedule was highly progressive up to the end of the 1990s and is still progressive, 
i.e. the income tax is conceived as an instrument that helps the government to reduce income inequal-
ity. However, little is known about the effective degree of progressivity viz. whether the German in-
come tax is progressive at all. Because of several tax exemptions, deductions, loopholes in the tax 
code and outright tax evasion, taxed income might fall apart from economic income in important 
ways. 
Our study suggests that the gap between actual and taxed income varies according to the income 
source. Wage earners benefit from tax erosion less than other taxpayer groups. Since the composition 
of income systematically varies with the income level, effective progression differs from statutory 
progression. 
Despite substantial tax erosion, we find that personal income taxation in Germany is effectively pro-
gressive: the effective average tax rate increases with income. Moreover, the distribution of the tax 
burden is highly concentrated. By way of an example, the top decile contributes more than half of the 
entire tax revenue and the share of taxes of the top percentile is about 23 %.1 The German economic 
elite is heavily affected by the personal income tax. The average tax liability in that group was almost 
10 million Euro in 1998 and its average tax rate amounted to about 40 %. As a result, the income tax 
substantially contributes to reduce the concentration of income in Germany. 
The studies that are most closely related to ours are Lang et al. (1997) and Dell (2005). The latter 
offers a thorough analysis of income concentration in Germany over the twentieth century. He investi-
gates tax returns statistics in form of tables containing, for a large number of brackets, the number of 
taxpayers and the amounts declared. Strikingly, Dell finds that throughout the post-war period top 
incomes were more concentrated in Germany than in France. Furthermore, he finds that until the late 
1980s, the German super-rich were richer than their US counterparts. After that decade, German in-
come concentration lies at the midway between the cases of France and the United States. 
Whereas Dell (2005) focuses on the long-run evolution of top incomes, we are interested in the distri-
butional implications of the income tax in the 1990s. Thus, we also investigate the distribution of in-
come taxes and the distribution of net incomes. Furthermore, we extend his analysis of gross incomes 
in some respects, e.g. by comparing the composition of top incomes to that in other countries and by 
scrutinizing the 0.001 % top income group, a fractile of the income distribution that has not yet been 
studied even for other countries. 
Lang et al. (1997) focussed on the “true” progressivity of the German income tax. Using survey data 
from the EVS for 1983, those authors found that the effective marginal tax rate for high incomes was 
                                                      
1   By comparison, Feenberg and Poterba (2000) find that in the US, in 1995 the top 0.5 % of households re-
ceived about 11 % of total gross income and contributed about 24 % of total income tax.  
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16 percentage points below the legislated one and that much of that difference was due to underreport-
ing of interest income and income from real assets. Similarly to our study, they also documented that 
the effective tax rate increases with income. However, they suggested that the tax rate increase is al-
most negligible at high income levels. 
The main problem of Lang et al. (1997) is that their data did not include households within the 2 % 
richest group of the population. Since those households represent the main contributors in terms of 
income tax, our analysis leads to results that are substantially more reliable. As the period that we 
study begins nine years after 1983 and ends fifteen years after, we cannot assess to what extent that 
sample bias distorted the results of Lang et al. (1997). Crucially, our results support a more positive 
assessment of the German income tax as a redistributive tool. According to the current investigation, 
the income tax does contribute to reduce inequality and its retrenchment would be likely to dramati-
cally increase income concentration in Germany. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data set in some details and discuss 
how we attempt to measure economic income using individual tax returns. The distribution and com-
position of incomes is the object of Sect. 3. Sect. 4 introduces the German income tax and shows how 
the income tax liability is distributed. In Sect. 5, the impact of the personal income tax on the distribu-
tion of net incomes is investigated. Concluding remarks are contained in Sect. 6. 
2 Data  and  Methodology 
Our investigation relies on official income tax returns for re-unified Germany in the years 1992, 1995, 
and 1998. More recent data on individual tax returns are presently not available. This is due to long-
lasting assessment procedures and the triennial interval between subsequent income tax statistics in 
Germany (the next wave, for 2001, is to become available for research purposes in 2006). We thus 
utilize all official data from income tax returns that are available for the 1990s. 
In the 1990s, there were almost 30 million tax units in Germany. Each yearly wave of data includes a 
representative sample of about 3 million tax returns, i.e. roughly 10 % of the entire taxpayer popula-
tion. Samples are drawn by the German Federal Statistical Office from the set of all tax files of each 
year so as to build a stratified random sample. The sampling fraction for pre-defined cells according to 
gross taxable income and other tax-relevant characteristics is determined by minimizing the standard 
error with respect to taxable income (Zwick, 1998). In particular, tax return samples include all tax-
payers with high incomes or high income losses.2 
In our sample, a tax unit may consist of a single taxpayer or a married couple. Single taxpayers are 
taxed according to the tax schedule for individuals (“Grundtabelle”). Couples choose between individ-
ual taxation and joint taxation with full income splitting. In the latter case, the couple’s tax liability 
equals twice the tax liability of a single taxpayer whose income is half of the couple’s income (“Split-
                                                      
2   Specifically, all taxpayers with a yearly gross taxable income larger than 250,000 DM (128,000 Euro) are 
included in our data set.  
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tingtabelle”). In nearly all cases, joint taxation with full income splitting is less onerous than individ-
ual taxation, therefore the former procedure is used by default in tax assessment.3  
The original data set includes all assessed taxpayers, i.e. single persons or married couples who file a 
tax return in a given year. Households living on social assistance or income replacement benefits (e.g. 
from private insurance or social security) usually do not file, unless they have other taxable income. 
Approximately, more than two-thirds of all German retirees do not file a tax return. Until 2005, Ger-
man tax law has charged life annuity funds only by the interest portion of the annuity payment (“Er-
tragsanteil”). On average, about 30 % of a typical old-age pension from the statutory pension scheme 
or from supplementary company pension schemes was subject to income taxation. Thus, many pen-
sioners without significant taxable income from other sources remained below the tax-free basic al-
lowance and did not file a tax return. Furthermore, households with wage earnings only file a tax re-
turn if they want to claim itemized deductions that are not already taken into account by their wage 
tax, which is withhold at source by the employer. 
For the above reasons, and as it is often the case with data from tax returns, our data set does not por-
tray well the lower tail of the income distribution. However, in the medium and upper range of the 
income distribution our sample is very representative, as nearly all domestic residents of these groups 
file a tax return. Therefore, we concentrate our analysis on the upper tail of income distribution. 
From Taxable Income to Gross Income 
In principle, German tax law employs a comprehensive notion of income which includes all earned 
income and capital income, as well as transfer income at least to some extent. As a matter of fact, 
exemptions and tax reliefs may create a substantial gap between taxable income and economic in-
come. To cope with this problem, we derive a measure of gross income by adding all tax-exempted 
incomes as well as tax reliefs that can be identified within the tax file information. Details of our pro-
cedure are provided in Tables A1 to A6 in the Appendix. The main points to be noted are as follows: 
•  Income from business activity includes taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from unin-
corporated business enterprise and from self-employed activities (professional services). Tax reliefs 
are taken into account as far as they are identifiable, just as the tax-exempted profits from outbound 
business investments. Capital gains from business activity could be identified separately. Unfortu-
nately, German income tax statistics do not provide information from financial accounting of firms 
(tax balance sheet, profit and loss statement). Therefore, we do not know to what extent firms ex-
ploit depreciations according to the declining balance method or provisions for impending losses or 
pension reserves. German tax law was deemed to be quite generous in this field up to the end of the 
1990s. A fortiori we cannot quantify the extent to which businessmen avoid taxation by e.g. dis-
guising private expenses as operating expenditures or transferring part of their profits abroad via 
distorted transfer prices.  
                                                      
3   Only in some cases of taxing exempted income with progression (“Progressionsvorbehalt”) or taxing ex-
traordinary revenues at reduced rates, individual taxation of couples might be favorable.  
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•  Our measure of wage income is calculated before deduction of allowable expenses. Taxable pen-
sions from former employment, which are part of the statutory income from employment, are ac-
counted as transfer income (see below). Tax-exempted foreign wage income is added. 
•  In the subsequent analysis, capital income from investments includes all capital income from pri-
vate investments, except income from business activities. Especially in this field we face difficult 
measurement issues. First, interest and dividend income was granted in the 1990s a rather high sav-
ers allowance of 6,000 DM / 3,070 Euro per year (double this amount for married couples). We 
compute those allowances as part of gross income whenever tax units claim them. However, many 
taxpayers with financial income did not claim them since their financial income was lower. Second, 
bank secrecy law might have encouraged tax evasion of financial income to some extent. By defini-
tion, evaded income is not recorded by tax returns and is therefore neglected by our study. Third, in 
Germany, capital gains from financial investments are taxable solely if they are classified as 
“speculation gains”, i.e. if sale of the asset closely follows acquisition of that asset. In 1998, this 
meant that the time lapse between buying and selling had to be less than two years in the case of 
real estate and less than six month in the case of other assets (e.g. securities) for the capital gain to 
be legally counted as taxable income. 
•  For decades, taxable income from renting and leasing has been a vast loophole for tax-saving ac-
tivities in Germany. Depreciation allowances, tax reliefs and generous accounting rules in combi-
nation with tax-free capital gains led to massive budgetary losses that could be set off against in-
come from other sources to a large extent. In 1998, positive incomes from renting and leasing 
amounting to 20.1 billion Euro were offset against losses of 37.7 billion Euro. Since most of this 
activities are likely to be motivated by tax avoidance, we ignore losses exceeding some thresholds.4  
•  As noted above, German income tax statistics only cover the main components of transfer income 
received by households with medium or higher income. Taxable transfer income includes taxable 
pensions derived from former employments, the taxable share of life annuity funds (pure interest 
portion of the annuity payment), and alimonies between separated and/or divorced spouses. We 
correct for the allowance for taxable pensions from former employment. Furthermore, we add the 
non-taxable share of life annuity funds, which is estimated as 70 % of the whole pension. The data 
set also provides the non-taxable replacement amounts from insurances for loss of earned income 
(e.g. benefits from unemployment or health insurance), as they are relevant for taxation with pro-
gression ("Progressionsvorbehalt").5  
As a result of our corrections, a gross income measure is obtained which is rather close to “pre tax, 
post transfer” household income. Although there are some shortcomings in comparison to a theoreti-
cally well-defined economic income concept in terms of the Schanz-Haig-Simons net accrual principle 
                                                      
4   Losses of more than 5,000 Euro from direct investments in real estate and of more than 2,500 Euro from 
shareholdings (closed property funds, property developer partnerships etc.) are disregarded in calculating 
gross income. 
5   These items might not be part of the current income according to the Schanz-Haig-Simons net accrual prin-
ciple as they comprehend disinvestments of the capital funds (see Cronin 1999). The resulting mismatch in 
the timing of income accruals is disregarded in order to compare our results with other surveys on household 
income.   
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(see e.g. Cronin 1999), our empirical measure of income is a reasonably effective tool to investigate 
the income situation and composition of the richer part of the German society, in particular for top-
income families. 
In order to rank taxpayers by deciles, we employ gross income as defined above, exclusive of capital 
gains. The main reasons behind this choice are as follows: 
•  Observed capital gains are predominantly capital gains that were realized from transfer of an enter-
prise, parts of an enterprise, or shareholdings. They form a very volatile component of income 
since they do not stem from regular business and are realized by individuals in a lumpy way. As 
they have often a remarkable impact on income, this would distort the ranking across taxpayers.6 
•  One observes an exceptional increase in realized capital gains from business activity in 1998 (29.3 
billion Euro against 8.8 billion Euro in 1995 and 8.3 billion Euro in 1992). The reason behind this 
is likely to be a “Lafontaine effect”:7 When the red-green government came into power in October 
1998 they announced far-reaching tax reforms according to the well-tried device "tax-cut-cum-
base-broadening". In this context, tax reliefs for capital gains were abolished in 1999 (specific al-
lowances, half average tax rate). There is some evidence from tax authorities that many entrepre-
neurs jumped on the last chance for realizing hidden reserves at reduced rates by short term trans-
ferring operating assets into private property. Therefore, this effect might be transitory to a large 
extent.8 Recent information from statistical offices about the nearly completed income tax statistics 
of 2001 confirms this conjecture.  
In the following Sections, we also present computations based on the notion of taxable gross income, 
which is the sum of the statutory single income components, called in German tax law “Summe der 
Einkünfte”. This income concept is, among those defined in the tax code, the one which is closest to 
an economic definition of income. Notice that the income measure on which the tariff is applied in 
order to compute the tax liability (“Zu versteuerndes Einkommen”) represented in 1998 about 80 % of 
taxable gross income. 
3  Top Income Distribution and Composition 
3.1 Structural  features 
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the German income tax along with some useful informa-
tion about the German economy. 
                                                      
6   Previous studies, as Piketty (2003) and Piketty and Saez (2003), also excluded capital gains from their in-
come measure. 
7   Oskar Lafontaine was the first finance minister in the red-green coalition government 1998/99.  




  Taxpayers, gross income and taxable income 
  compared to macroeconomic indicators 1992-1998 
unit 1992 1995 1998
Income taxpayers (assessment)  1 000   29 479   29 676   28 673 
  Single assessment (singles)  1 000   13 961   14 299   13 789 
  Joint assessment (married couples)
1)  1 000   15 518   15 377   14 884 
Potential tax units total
2)  1 000   44 502   44 619   45 173 
Estimated non-filers  1 000   15 023   14 943   16 500 
Private households total
3)  1 000   35 700   36 938   37 532 
Taxpayers as percentage of potential tax units %   66.2    66.5    63.5 
Taxpayers as percentage of private households %   82.6    80.3    76.4 
Gross income
4) (tax statistics) mill. Euro  906 810  1 003 615  1 063 510 
Taxable gross income (tax statistics) mill. Euro  841 412   893 395   940 752 
Taxable gross income as perc. of gross income %   92.8    89.0    88.5 
Gross income less capital gains and transfers mill. Euro  822 813   896 486   928 090 
Gross domestic product
5) mill. Euro 1 613 200  1 801 300  1 929 400 
Primary income of private households
5) mill. Euro 1 235 240  1 354 570  1 439 110 
Gross income less capital gains and transfers as 
percentage of primary income private households %   66.6    66.2    64.5 
Wage income
6) (tax statistics) mill. Euro  682 194   746 444   750 390 
Wages and salaries
5) (national accounts) mill. Euro  750 210   806 370   830 500 
Wage income from tax statistics as percentage     
of wages and salaries from national accounts %   90.9    92.6    90.4 
Income from business activities and capital 
income
4) (tax statistics, less capital gains) mill. Euro  140 818   142 637   178 401 
Entrepreneurial and property income of private 
households
5) (national accounts) mill. Euro  318 880   358 390   408 550 
  Entrepreneurial income mill. Euro  149 500   164 710   173 370 
  Property income (net)
7) mill. Euro  169 380   193 680   235 180 
Business and capital income from tax statistics as 
percentage of entrepreneurial and property 
income from national accounts %   44.2    39.8    43.7 
1) Married couples living together are assesed as one tax payer.- 2) Derived from population census statistics: Entire population 
of 20 years and older, married couples counted as one tax unit.- 3) Current population survey, may of resp. years.- 4) Taxable 
and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics.- 5) At current prices, national accounts.- 6) Taxable wage 
income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments, plus tax-exempted foreign 
income.- 7) Recieved less payed property income (interest, distributed income of corporations, property income attributed to 
insurance policy holders, rents).
Source: Income tax statistics 1992-1998; current population survey; national accounts.
 
 
In each wave, about 29 million income tax returns were filled by German taxpayers. Slightly more 
than fifty percent of those returns were joint files of married couples. By international standards, the 
share of the German population that pays income tax is rather large. Assuming that one taxpayer cor-
responds to one household,9 more than three quarters of all German households pay income tax. The 
number of assessed taxpayers fell by 1 million units from 1995 to 1998 after that the income tax re-
                                                      




form of 1996 relaxed some provisions for filing tax returns. Since then, taxpayers with only wage 
income often are not obliged to file, independently of their level of taxable income. 
Total gross income recorded in the official tax statistics was about one trillion in 1998, which repre-
sents almost two thirds of the primary income of private households as documented by national ac-
counts. As shown by Table 1, the discrepancy between gross income and income from national ac-
counts is mainly due to incomes from business and capital. Unfortunately, German national accounts 
do not provide differentiated information on business and capital income according to the categories 
used for the income tax assessment. Capital goods depreciation is differently treated in those two sta-
tistical sources. Non-profit organizations like churches, foundations, trade unions, business associa-
tions or political parties are classified as part of private households in national accounts – these or-
ganizations often have substantial capital income which regularly remains tax-free. And, as we ex-
plained in the previous Section, not all capital income of private households is recorded by the official 
tax statistics. All these factors together may explain the discrepancy between the national accounts and 
the tax data used here. 
3.2  The distribution of top incomes 
The distribution of gross income across the various deciles of the taxpayer population is presented in 
Table 2, while corresponding levels of nominal income are reported in Table 3. Our comments will 
mainly refer to 1998, the corresponding results for 1992 and 1995 are presented in the Tables. 
Over the 1990s, the poorer half of the taxpayer population earned slightly more than one fifth of over-
all gross income. In 1998, median income amounted to less than 29,000 Euro, while average income 
was 36,000 Euro. The first four deciles within the upper tail of the income distribution received about 
47 % of overall income, so that their average income was not much larger than average overall in-
come. As shown by Table 3, average income of the 9
th decile was 55 % larger than average income. 
The share of total gross income received by the top decile was about 32 %, see Table 2. The Gini coef-
ficient of the gross income distribution is about 0.44 in 1998. Although it increased between 1995 and 
1998, there was almost no change compared to its level in 1992. Compared to other estimates of Gini 
coefficients for the German income distribution, our estimates take into account the higher inequality 
in the distribution of non-labor incomes. For example, Becker and Hauser (2003) report Gini coeffi-
cients of about 0.32, 0.47, and 0.43 for gross income from dependent employment, self employment, 
and capital income, respectively, on the basis of the 1998 income and consumption survey (EVS). As 
mentioned in the introduction, the EVS does not include the richest households, and inequality meas-
ures derived from it are thus not directly comparable with ours.  
In Table 2 we also report the distribution of income when capital gains are included. Since capital 
gains are concentrated at the top of the income distribution, the top decile now appears to receive 33 % 




  Distribution of gross income 1992-1998 
Income fractiles 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998
  1
st - 5
th decile   21.3    21.9    21.0    21.3    22.0    21.1 
  6
th - 9
th decile   47.0    47.2    46.8    46.6    46.9    45.8 
  10
th decile   31.8    30.8    32.2    32.0    31.0    33.1 
 Total   100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
  Top 1%   10.2    9.3    10.2    10.5    9.6    11.3 
  Top 0.1%   3.9    3.5    4.0    4.0    3.6    4.7 
  Top 0.01%   1.4    1.4    1.6    1.5    1.5    1.8 
  Top 0.001%   0.5    0.5    0.6    0.5    0.5    0.7 
 Gini coefficient
2)   0.4309    0.4181    0.4355    0.4349    0.4219    0.4491 
Gross income







1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 
2) Negative gross income = 0.
Source: Income tax statistics 1992-1998; own calculations.
 
 
We now come to the core object of our analysis, namely the upper 10 % fraction of the income distri-
bution. The lower income threshold for that group was in 1998 about 65,000 Euro, see Table 3. 
Households within this group are very heterogeneous, the top decile includes both families from the 
middle class and the super rich. An adequate understanding of income inequality and tax progressivity 
requires one to carefully distinguish between various subgroups within the top decile. 
Table 3 
 Gross  income  1992-1998 
  average income and percentiles 
Income fractiles 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998
   1
st decile -  0.3  -  0.2  -  1.6  -  1  -  1  -  4    4.8    6.2    5.6    19    23    19 
   2
nd decile   8.2    10.1    10.3    27    30    29    11.6    13.7    14.2    47    50    49 
   3
rd decile   14.5    16.6    17.4    48    50    48    17.1    19.3    20.3    69    70    70 
   4
th decile   19.3    21.5    22.6    63    64    63    21.2    23.5    24.8    85    86    85 
   5
th decile   23.1    25.5    26.9    76    76    75    24.9    27.5    29.0    100    100    100 
   6
th decile   26.9    29.6    31.3    88    88    87    29.0    31.9    33.9    116    116    117 
   7
th decile   31.5    34.8    36.9    103    104    102    34.3    37.9    40.3    137    138    139 
   8
th decile   37.7    41.8    44.5    124    125    123    41.6    46.1    49.2    167    168    170 
   9
th decile   47.1    52.1    56.0    155    156    155    54.1    60.0    64.9    217    218    223 
 10
th decile   96.8    103.4    116.0    318    308    322  . . .  .  .  . 
 Total   30.5    33.5    36.0    100    100    100  . . .  .  .  . 
  90%-95%   60.5    66.9    72.8    198    200    202    69.2    76.3    83.6    278    278    288 
  95%-99%   88.8    96.7    107.2    291    289    297    137.0    144.4    162.7    550    526    561 
  Top 1%   309.9    312.2    367.7   1 017    932   1 020  . . .  .  .  . 
  99.0%-99.9%   213.9    217.9    249.1    702    650    691    480.5    467.2    551.9   1 928   1 701   1 902 
  Top 0.1%  1 173.5   1 161.2   1 435.1   3 851   3 465   3 981  . . .  .  .  . 
  99.90%-99.99%   816.3    775.4    939.3   2 679   2 314   2 606   2 017.9   1 898.1   2 338.8   8 097   6 909   8 059 
  Top 0.01%  4 389.5   4 633.1   5 898.1   14 405   13 824   16 363  . . .  .  .  . 
  99.990%-99.999%  3 320.3   3 274.9   4 078.6   10 896   9 772   11 315   7 627.0   8 053.9   10 276.7   30 602   29 316   35 409 
  Top 0.001%  14 037.7   16 891.6   22 314.7   46 067   50 402   61 907  . . .  .  .  . 
Average gross income
1)
mean = 100 1 000 Euro
Gross income
1)
median = 100 1 000 Euro
Highest gross income
1) (percentile)
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.





Therefore, we decompose the top decile into smaller groups. The bottom half of the top decile, with 
incomes between 65,000 Euro and 84,000 Euro is still relatively close to a widely held notion of mid-
dle class. Very high incomes are to be found within the top 1 % fraction of the income distribution. 
These were households that in 1998 exhibited a gross income of more than 163,000 Euro. All those 
households are present in our data set. Hence, we can give a picture of the top 1 % fraction of the in-
come distribution in Germany that does not entail any error that can be ascribed to sampling proce-
dures. As revealed by Table 2, the top 1 % of the income distribution received about 10 % of total 
income less capital gains in 1998; if one includes the capital gains reported in the tax statistics, their 
share becomes 11.3 %. 
Likewise, all German households whose income belongs to the top 0.1 % of the income distribution 
are present in our data set. In any given year, this group includes about 29,000 tax units. In 1998 you 
had to earn a gross income of more than 552,000 Euro to be included in the 1 ‰ group of the richest 
German taxpayers – these are the “millionaires” in terms of old D-Mark. About 4 % of total gross 
income accrued to this group in 1998. Including capital gains, the income share of the top 0.1 % of the 
income distribution is 4.7 %. In other words, their average income was almost fifty times larger than 
average income and sixty-five times larger than median income. 
The top 0.01 % of the income distribution captures some 2,900 households. Entry in this group was 
restricted in 1998 to households that made at least 2,340,000 Euro of regular income, i.e. without capi-
tal gains. This tiny group received 1.6 % of total income. 
Table 2 and Table 3 also provide some information about the top 0.001 % of the income distribution, a 
fractile that has not been studied so far in the literature. This group was formed in Germany by some 
290 households, with incomes larger than 10,280,000 Euro. We refer to this group as to the economic 
elite of Germany. The average income within this group, without capital gains, was in 1998 about 
22,310,000 Euro. This is about one thousand times what a typical German blue-collar worker makes – 
say, the average of the 4
th decile. Those 290 families received about 0.6 % of total income. 
3.3  The composition of top incomes 
The rich are not only different from most of us because they have more money. One further difference 
relates to their income sources. This is shown in Table 4, which presents evidence on the composition 
of gross income in 1998. 
While wage income represents almost 73 % of total gross income and households up to the 9
th decile 
receive three fourth or more of their income in form of wages and salaries, the corresponding share for 
the top decile is less than 60 %. This tendency for the top decile to rely more heavily on income from 
business and capital is well documented also for other countries. 
Within the top decile, variation of income composition is huge. While, on average, households in the 
top decile receive almost 60 % of their incomes in form of wages, only 30 % of the income received 
by the top 1 % is made up of wages and only 16 % of income in the top 1 ‰ is derived from wage 





  Composition of gross income 1998 








th decile   100.0    1.5  -  0.4    1.1    74.6    4.7    3.6    1.1    19.2    3.6 
  6
th - 9
th decile   100.0    5.7    3.6    1.4    80.6    3.3    2.6    0.8    10.4    0.6 
 10
th decile   100.0    26.5    13.7    11.3    59.7    9.7    7.3    2.4    4.1    5.8 
 Total   100.0    11.5    6.0    4.5    72.6    5.7    4.3    1.4    10.2    2.9 
  Top 1%   100.0    49.3    28.1    18.8    30.4    18.0    14.3    3.7    2.2    14.3 
  Top 0.1%   100.0    59.2    47.0    9.1    15.8    23.9    20.7    3.2    1.1    20.4 
  Top 0.01%   100.0    68.4    61.5    2.1    6.5    24.4    22.5    1.9    0.7    14.0 



























Capital income less capital gains
1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
Quelle: Berechnungen mit dem Einkommensteuer-Simulationsmodell des DIW Berlin.
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business 
enterprise, from self-employed activities (professional services), plus tax reliefs, plus allowance for capital gains from business activity, plus tax-exempted foreign 
income.- 3) Taxable wage income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments, plus tax-exempted foreign 
income.- 4) Taxable income from investments (exclusive income from business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance.- 5) Taxable income from 
renting and leasing, plus higher losses from renting and leasing.- 6) Taxable pensions from former employ-ments, taxable share of life annuity funds (mere 
interest portion of the annuity payment), alimonies between separated and divorced spouses, plus allowance for taxable pensions from former employments, plus 
non-taxable share of life annuity funds (estimated), plus non-taxable replacement amounts from insurances for loss of earned income (e.g. benefits from 
unemployment or health insurance), as far as relevant for taxation with progression ("Progressionsvorbehalt").
Source: Income tax statistics 1998; own calculations.
  
 
As a consequence, the group with the highest incomes is the one with the lowest wage share. The 290 
richest families earned on average less than 2 % of their income from wages and salaries. In 1998, the 
average member of this group earned only some 400,000 Euro in form of salary; luckily enough, this 
amount was complemented by 5.8 million Euro derived from capital income and 16 million Euro de-
rived from business income. On top of that, the average member of the German economic elite re-
ceived 2.1 million Euro capital gains. 
Piketty (2003) and Piketty and Saez (2003) contain a detailed description of income composition in, 
respectively, France and the US. In order to compare those countries with Germany, we now employ 
those authors’ definition of household population to compute the income shares of the various frac-
tiles. While in the rest of our study we define population size by counting all tax units, here we follow 
the approach of Piketty and Saez and define the fractiles for Germany relative to the total number of 
potential tax units in the entire population of 20 years and older (married couples counted as one tax 
unit). As documented in Table 1 above, population size as defined in those terms amounts to some 
45.2 million units. We also make the reasonable assumption that all those potential tax units that are 
not assessed for tax purposes do not belong to the top decile of the income distribution. 
Results from the comparison with France and the US are reported in Table 5. In all three countries, the 
share of wage income monotonically decreases with increasing fractile within the top decile. Interest-
ingly, the relative weight of wage income is rather close across countries if one neglects the top 1 %. 
Within the top 1 %, cross-country differences are overwhelming. The share of wage income is much 
larger in the US than in France, and in France it is much larger than in Germany. Strikingly, in the US 
about 45 % of all income accruing to the top 0.01 % consists of wages; for the corresponding group in 




  Share of wage income in the US, France, and Germany in the top decile 1998 
  based on potential tax units
1) 
  in % 
Income fractiles
1)
  90%-95%   82.5      89.2      89.6   
  95%-99%   73.8      79.7      79.8   
  99.0%-99.5%   52.8      66.2      69.0   
  99.5%-99.9%   39.4      50.0      62.7   
  99.90%-99.99%   25.7      40.1      57.8   
  99.99%-100%   7.8      21.9      44.8   
Germany France United States
Gross income
2)
1) Based on potential tax units: Entire population of 20 years and older, married 
couples counted as one tax unit.- 2) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as 
included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.
Source: Germany: Income tax statistics 1998; own calculations. France: 
Piketty (2001: Tab. B-16). US: Piketty and Saez (2003: Table III).
 
 
Thus, our analysis adds a novel aspect to the comparison of Germany with the US and France, as dis-
cussed by Dell (2005). He found that, with respect to the concentration of income, Germany is a mid-
dle case between the highly concentrated US income distribution and the less concentrated French 
one. With respect to the income composition pattern, our analysis suggests that it is France which is in 
the middle between the US and Germany. The German affluent rely much less on wages and salaries 
for their incomes than their counterparts in France and the US. 
In order to arrive at a better understanding of the composition of top incomes in Germany, we investi-
gate how homogeneous income sources are at the individual level. In the left part of Table 6 all tax-
payers in the top percentile are ordered according to their income share stemming from the three main 
income sources: wage, business activity, and capital income. That table reveals that 22.4 % of those 
taxpayers can clearly be identified as employees or managers since their personal income stemmed by 
more than 90 % from wage income. Some other 24.2 % of taxpayers in the top percentile can be iden-
tified as entrepreneurs and professionals, since more than 90 % of their personal income stemmed 
from business activity. Only 3 % of the top percentile can be identified as rentiers, whose income is 
mainly generated by interests, dividends, and rents. About half of the top 1 % includes taxpayers with 
mixed income from the various sources.  
On the right hand side of Table 6, the same analysis is conducted for the top 0.001 % of the income 
distribution, the economic elite of Germany. By the same token, one can identify in this group a por-
tion of employees equal to 1 %, a portion of entrepreneurs equal to 51.7 % and a portion of rentiers 
equal to 15.4 %. Hence, the German economic elite consists almost entirely of entrepreneurs and ren-




  Composition of taxpayers within the top 1 % and in the top 0.001 % quantile 1998 




















income     
less capital 
gains
from ... to ...
0 - 10 %   41.4    41.2    69.4    95.1    19.8    57.0 
10 - 20 %   7.4    3.3    9.5    3.1    1.9    8.7 
20 - 30 %   4.7    2.8    5.0    6.3 
30 - 40 %   4.3    2.7    3.5    2.4 
40 - 50 %   4.0    2.8    2.7    3.5 
50 - 60 %   3.8    3.2    2.2    3.5 
60 - 70 %   3.6    4.1    1.8    2.1 
70 - 80 %   3.7    5.7    1.5    6.3 
80 - 90 %   4.5    9.9    1.3    11.9    3.8 
90 - 100 %   22.4    24.2    3.0    1.0    51.7    15.4 
 Total   100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
Taxpayers by share of Taxpayers by share of
Top 0.001 %
  0.7 
  2.8 
  2.8 
Share of income 




% of total % of total
1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die 
Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable wage 
income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments, plus tax-
exempted foreign income.- 3) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business enterprise, from self-
employed activities (professional services), plus tax reliefs, plus allowance for capital gains from business activity, 
plus tax-exempted foreign income, less capital gains. 
Source: Income tax statistics 1998; own calculations.
 
 
What could explain the different composition of top incomes in Germany as compared to France and 
the US? Why does Das Kapital matter so much in Germany? We conjecture that the following two 
factors may substantially contribute to account for the observed differences. First, as suggested by Dell 
(2005), the relatively favourable tax treatment of capital income in Germany as compared to France 
and the US over the last decades may be part of the answer.10 Second, the relatively low remuneration 
of German CEOs up to the end of the nineties might explain the difference in top income composition 
with respect to the US. 
Another striking feature of the German case that emerges from our study is the relative weight of in-
come from business activity and income from interests and dividends. The former is substantially 
larger than the latter. This finding may be driven by the very large share of unincorporated firms in 
Germany. There, even firms of considerable size are often unincorporated. This may be due to various 
cross-country differences with respect to tax rules, legal frameworks, and financial systems. 
Our dataset is likely to underestimate the portion of rentiers within the top income groups. First, Ger-
man rentiers are likely to derive some part of their income in form of capital gains, e.g. in the stock 
                                                      
10   In particular, German inheritance and gift taxes have very low effective burden and fiscal impact due to low 
assessment values and high personal allowances. Nowadays, revenue form inheritance and gift taxes in Ger-
many accounts only for 0.15 % of GDP, compared to 0.36 % in the USA and 0.55 % in France. Moreover, 
the former general wealth tax on personal and corporate wealth suffered from the same problems and had no 
significant impact on tax revenue or income distribution. See OECD (2004).   
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market, which showed a rising trend during the nineties. Our dataset only covers a subset of those 
gains, namely those that are subject to taxation because the lapse of time between buying and selling 
was less than six months. Not unsurprisingly, those capital gains amounted to a relatively small 
amount. Second, rentiers might exploit the German bank secrecy law in order to evade some income 
tax due on their financial income. 
3.4  Differences between West and East Germany 
From 1945 to 1990, Germany was split into two states, the FRG (West Germany) and the GDR (East 
Germany). Immediately before reunification, per capita GDP in capitalist FRG was much higher than 
in socialist GDR. Since then, regional convergence in economic terms has been a major concern of 
German public policy. 
Whereas regional inequalities in terms of average income are well documented, little is known about 
the pattern of top incomes in the eastern and the western part of the country. As shown by Table 7, 
regional disparities matter not only for the absolute level of incomes, but also with respect to their 
composition. 
Table 7 
  Shares of taxpayers and gross income, and composition of gross income in East Germany (excl. Berlin), 1998  








th decile   18.7    19.1    100.0    1.8    1.0    0.6    76.8    2.1    2.0    0.1    19.3    2.2 
  6
th - 9
th decile   12.2    12.0    100.0    5.4    3.5    1.4    86.8    1.4    1.4    0.0    6.3    1.5 
 10
th decile   8.1    6.9    100.0    29.7    10.4    15.5    65.0    3.8    3.4    0.4    1.5    4.0 
 Total   15.0    11.8    100.0    8.7    3.9    3.7    79.3    2.1    2.0    0.1    9.8    2.2 
  Top 1%   5.5    4.1    100.0    64.7    21.9    33.4    25.2    9.4    8.3    1.1    0.7    9.7 
  Top 0.1%   2.3    1.6    100.0    73.8    29.3    26.9    11.6    14.5    12.9    1.6    0.1    14.7 
  Top 0.01%   0.7    0.7    100.0    81.6    33.1    8.7    7.2    11.3    10.7    0.5    0.0    11.4 







Composition of gross income in East Germany

























1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
Quelle: Berechnungen mit dem Einkommensteuer-Simulationsmodell des DIW Berlin.
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business enterprise, from self-employed 
activities (professional services), plus tax reliefs, plus allowance for capital gains from business activity, plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 3) Taxable wage income (before deduction of 
allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments, plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 4) Taxable income from investments (exclusive income from business activities), 
inclusive receipts below the savers allowance.- 5) Taxable income from renting and leasing, plus higher losses from renting and leasing.- 6) Taxable pensions from former employ-ments, taxable 
share of life annuity funds (mere interest portion of the annuity payment), alimonies between separated and divorced spouses, plus allowance for taxable pensions from former employments, plus 
non-taxable share of life annuity funds (estimated), plus non-taxable replacement amounts from insurances for loss of earned income (e.g. benefits from unemployment or health insurance), as far
as relevant for taxation with progression ("Progressionsvorbehalt").
Source: Income tax statistics 1998; own calculations.
 
 
The share of the entire German population that lived in East Germany, Berlin excluded, amounts to 
17.1 %, whereas the share of taxpayers was only 15 % in 1998. Presumably, this reflects much higher 
unemployment and lower incomes and pensions in the eastern part of Germany. Within top income 
groups, the portion of East Germans declines rapidly.  
Table 7 also reports the composition of gross income in East Germany. Comparing this table with 
Table 4 reveals some distinct traits of income formation in East Germany, for instance, with respect to 
top incomes, the relatively low income share stemming from business enterprise and the relatively 
large share of income from professional activities.  
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4  Effective Income Taxation 
An income tax reduces income inequality if the tax schedule is progressive and the tax base closely 
approximates the economic income of taxpayers. We now turn to the question whether in Germany the 
income tax effectively is progressive and contributes to reduce income inequality.11 
True progression depends both on the legislated tax schedule and the pattern of tax erosion. We first 
examine the statutory tax schedule and then investigate the pattern of tax erosion across various in-
come groups. 
4.1  Statutory income tax schedule 
In Germany, the income tax of a given taxpayer is computed as a function of his nominal taxable in-
come (“Zu versteuerndes Einkommen”) in that year. The resulting curves are plotted in Figure 1. The 
tax schedule includes a basic allowance (“Grundfreibetrag”), which means that households with low 
income pay no income tax. The marginal tax rate linearly increases with income until income reaches 
a threshold. For incomes larger than that threshold, the marginal tax rate stays constant. Hence, the 
average tax rate converges towards the top marginal tax rate when income goes to infinity. Since the 
average tax rate increases with income, the tax schedule is progressive. 
In 1992, the income tax schedule introduced in 1990 was still applied. It displayed a fairly low basic 
allowance (2,871 Euro), a small bracket with the entrance rate of 19 % and a linear rise in marginal tax 
rates up to the top rate of 53 %, beginning at 61,376 Euro. At an income level of about 500,000 Euro, 
the average tax rate was close to the 50 % level.  
According to a far reaching sentence of the German federal constitutional court in 1993, the basic 
allowance had to cover the subsistence level as defined in social welfare assistance. While the 1990 
tax schedule was retained until 1995, as a preliminary transitional rule the basic allowance was in-
creased up to the subsistence level of about 6,000 Euro; in a following tax bracket of 1,800 Euro the 
relief against the 1990 schedule was sharply reduced, which caused very high marginal tax rates. In 
1996, the income tax schedule was reshaped so as to start with a relatively high entrance rate (25,9 %) 
and with a marginal tax rate reaching the 1990 tax schedule at a level close to 30,000 Euro. 
                                                      




  Income tax schedule 1992, 1995 and 1998 
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4.2  Tax base erosion 
As a first step, we offer an estimate of the gap between economic income and income considered for 
tax purposes. As already shown by Table 1, total taxable gross income amounts to about 90 % of total 
gross income. Over the years, the share of taxable gross income in gross income decreased, reaching a 
level of 88.5 % in 1998, see Table 8. This suggests that tax-base broadening did not occur in Germany 
during the period 1992-1998. As a matter of fact, during the 1990s tax subsidies were increased in 
order to promote investment in the regions of the former GDR. In particular, investments in real estate 
as well as capital equipment were generously subsidized by special allowances (e.g. 50 %-depreciation 
in the first year). This might have had an impact not only on incomes from renting and leasing but also 
on incomes from business activity. 
How does the erosion of the tax base affect the various quantiles of the income distribution and the 
various income categories? Table 8 addresses the first issue. It reveals that the gap between taxable 
gross income and gross income is enormous for the bottom decile. Up to the top decile, the share of 
taxable gross income in gross income is rather stable, varying between 88.3 % and 92.6 %.  
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The relation between income tax comprehensiveness and income level has an inverted-U shape, with a 
maximum in the 9
th decile.12 While about 91 % of the income of the middle class (6
th to 9
th decile) is 
considered for tax purposes, only 82 % of the income of the lower classes (1
st to 5
th decile) is subject 
to the tax and only 85.5 % of the income of the rich (top 1 %) does the same. However, within the 
latter group, the share of taxable gross income in gross income tends to increase with the income 
level. In 1998, almost 90 % of the income of the economic elite of Germany was subject to the income 
tax, according to our data. 
Table 8 
  Taxable gross income as percentage of gross income 1992-1998 
  % 
Income fractiles 1992 1995 1998
   1
st decile -  85.7  -  195.6  -  528.9 
   2
nd decile   82.2    77.2    76.4 
   3
rd decile   83.3    80.0    80.6 
   4
th decile   88.2    85.7    85.4 
   5
th decile   91.7    88.9    88.3 
   6
th decile   93.3    90.3    89.4 
   7
th decile   94.2    90.9    89.9 
   8
th decile   95.3    92.6    91.4 
   9
th decile   96.3    93.7    92.6 
 10
th decile   93.6    88.6    88.7 
 Total   92.8    89.0    88.5 
  Top 1%   90.8    82.5    85.5 
  Top 0.1%   91.1    82.7    87.1 
  Top 0.01%   93.1    84.2    88.1 
  Top 0.001%   93.5    81.6    89.7 
Taxable gross income            
as percentage of                
gross income plus capital gains
Gross income
1)
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in 
income tax statistics, less capital gains.




In order to detect the driving forces behind this finding, Table 9 provides some information about the 
erosion of the income tax base in the various deciles for the year 1998 and relates it to the composition 
of their incomes. As shown in Table 9, wage income is almost completely subject to taxation. Also 
income from business activity is to a very large extent subject to taxation. This is not so for capital 
income and for transfer income. 
                                                      
12  In their study of income tax avoidance in Germany in 1983, Lang et al. (1997) found that the portion of 
taxed to gross income tends to increase in the income deciles. Their data came from the Income and Con-
sumption Survey (EVS), which does not include households with top incomes.  
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The pattern of erosion of the tax base concerning interests and dividends is not very different from the 
one concerning transfer income. In both cases, about half of the tax base is legally eroded. In both 
cases, the proportion of eroded tax base decreases with income. 
The case of incomes from renting and leasing is special. Erosion is so extreme that positive economic 
incomes turn into negative taxable incomes. The ability to perform such a transformation is increasing 
with the income level of the household. According to our data, in 1998 the top percentile of the in-
come distribution could transform each Euro of positive income from renting and leasing into two 
Euros of income losses for tax purposes. This was not magic, but just a careful exploitation of loop-
holes in the tax code.13 
 
Table 9 
  Taxable gross income as percentage of gross income 1998 




th decile   82.4    92.0    90.5    100.0    13.8    24.3  -  21.2    28.8 
  6
th - 9
th decile   91.1    96.6    84.3    99.9    3.4    28.4  -  82.8    47.9 
 10
th decile   88.7    96.7    98.2    99.4    11.4    72.3  -  175.8    54.2 
 Total   88.5    96.3    94.9    99.8    9.6    51.7  -  125.3    41.2 
  Top 1%   85.5    96.8    99.4    99.0    27.6    86.2  -  202.2    52.5 
  Top 0.1%   87.1    96.3    99.9    98.5    50.8    92.1  -  216.7    50.6 
  Top 0.01%   88.1    94.4    100.0    97.6    65.5    93.2  -  262.3    39.6 





























1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
Quelle: Berechnungen mit dem Einkommensteuer-Simulationsmodell des DIW Berlin.
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable income from agriculture and 
forestry, from business enterprise, from self-employed activities (professional services), plus tax reliefs, plus allowance for capital gains 
from business activity, plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 3) Taxable wage income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus 
taxable pensions from former employments, plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 4) Taxable income from investments (exclusive income 
from business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance and taxable capital gains from private investments (solely 
speculation gains).- 5) Taxable income from renting and leasing, plus higher losses from renting and leasing.- 6) Taxable pensions from 
former employments, taxable share of life annuity funds (mere interest portion of the annuity payment), alimonies between separated and 
divorced spouses, plus allowance for taxable pensions from former employments, plus non-taxable share of life annuity funds (estimated), 
plus non-taxable replacement amounts from insurances for loss of earned income (e.g. benefits from unemployment or health insurance), 
as far as relevant for taxation with progression ("Progressionsvorbehalt").
Source: Income tax statistics 1998; own calculations.
 
 
                                                      
13  From a pure fiscal perspective, the German government would be better off if incomes from renting and 
leasing were not subject to taxation. We used a personal income tax micro-simulation model to estimate the 
revenue impact of declaring those incomes tax-free. Disregarding any behavioural response, in 1998 German 
tax revenue would have increased by 7.6 billion Euro (0.4 % of GDP) if incomes from renting and leasing 
had been untaxed.  
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4.3  True tax progressivity  
Assessed income tax liability (“Festgesetzte Einkommensteuer”) is computed as the tax burden on the 
entire taxable income assessed for the tax year (which is the calendar year), on which the tax schedule 
is applied. Paid withholding taxes, such as the monthly wage tax or capital yields taxes on interest and 
dividends, are offset against the income tax liability and are correspondingly taken into account by our 
tax measure. Notice that in the 1990s the German corporate income tax was integrated into the per-
sonal income tax according to the imputation system. Domestic corporation tax on dividends received 
from domestic corporations was fully credited against income tax liability (full imputation); corre-
spondingly, the entire gross amount of distributed profits was included in the income tax base.14  
How is the tax burden distributed across the income distribution? The distribution of personal income 
taxes is presented in Table 10. The distribution of the tax burden is very unequal, and exhibits a Gini 
coefficient of 0.7 in 1998. The time pattern is similar to the one observed for the development of in-
come inequality: the Gini coefficient increased somewhat between 1995 and 1998 after a slight decline 
in the first half of the 1990s. Interestingly, the top decile contributes more than half of the total tax 
revenue. On average, in 1998 households in the top decile paid about 30,000 Euro as income tax. By 
comparison, the average income tax paid by the 10 % poorest households was about 500 Euro. At the 
other end of the distribution, in the same year the top 1 % on average paid about 137,000 Euro as in-
come tax, and the richest 0.001 % almost 10 million Euro on average. 
Average effective tax rates for the various income groups are presented in Table 11. For each group, 
the effective tax rate is lower than the legislated tax rate. Effective tax rates are found to be increasing 
with income, which suggests that the German income tax is truly progressive. 
In 1998, the average tax rate for the entire taxpayer population was 16 % and taxpayers at median 
income were effectively hit by a 10 % tax rate. The effective tax rate is found to increase with the 
level of gross income and to reach about 25 % in the highest decile. Within the highest income decile, 
the effective tax rate increases rapidly, reaching 36.5 % for the top 0.1 % group and getting close to 
40 % for the economic elite.  
As a plausibility check, we present the picture of tax progression that one obtains if the income tax is 
set in relation to the official notion of taxable gross income, rather than our notion of gross income 
plus capital gains. Results appear in the right hand side of Table 11. In comparison to our measure, 
this one exhibits somewhat higher tax rates. For instance, the average tax rate is about 11 % at the 
median and 44 % for the economic elite. Also according to this measure, the effective tax rate strictly 
increases with income. 
All in all, our findings support the view that, in Germany, the personal income tax effectively is pro-
gressive and that therefore, this instrument does contribute to reduce the inequality of disposable in-
come in the German population. The effective burden of the income tax is not as high as the German 
tax schedule would imply, but it is still substantial. 
                                                      




  Assessed income tax liability 1992-1998 
  structure and average tax burden 
Income fractiles 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998
   1
st decile   0.2    0.2    0.8    0.1    0.1    0.5 
   2
nd decile   0.6    0.6    0.3    0.3    0.3    0.2 
   3
rd decile   1.9    2.1    1.6    0.9    1.0    0.9 
   4
th decile   3.6    3.9    3.1    1.7    1.9    1.8 
   5
th decile   4.9    5.1    4.3    2.3    2.5    2.5 
   6
th decile   6.0    6.3    5.5    2.9    3.1    3.3 
   7
th decile   7.6    8.1    7.4    3.6    4.0    4.4 
   8
th decile   10.2    10.9    10.4    4.9    5.3    6.2 
   9
th decile   14.5    15.5    15.3    7.0    7.6    9.1 
 10
th decile   50.6    47.4    51.2    24.3    23.3    30.4 
 Total   100.0    100.0    100.0    4.8    4.9    5.9 
  Top 1%   24.2    20.3    23.2    115.8    99.8    137.4 
  Top 0.1%   10.8    8.8    10.6    516.6    432.1    631.4 
  Top 0.01%   4.2    3.6    4.3   2 031.5   1 781.8   2 574.0 
  Top 0.001%   1.4    1.3    1.6   6 549.7   6 228.4   9 708.1 
 Gini coefficient   0.6746    0.6644    0.7037 




average tax burden in 1 000 Euro
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.
Source: Income tax statistics 1992-1998; own calculations.
 
 
Our analysis also shows some variation of the tax burden across income percentiles over time. During 
the 1990s, the average tax rate for the top 0.1 % markedly decreased by roughly 5 percentage points, 
see Table 11. During the same period, the average tax rate for the other income groups remained more 
or less stable or even increased. The reason behind this diverging evolution may be found in the fol-
lowing phenomena. On the one hand, top incomes exhibited relatively large losses from renting and 
leasing in 1998, while benefiting from the high concentration of capital gains in 1998, which were 
taxed at a reduced rate (half of the individual average tax rate). On the other hand, inflationary income 
growth implied that the tax burden increased – because of bracket creep – more rapidly in the case of 





  Effective income tax rates 1992-1998 
Income fractiles 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998
   1
st decile   25.0    19.8    207.1  -  29.1  -  10.1  -  39.2 
   2
nd decile   3.3    2.8    1.6    4.0    3.6    2.1 
   3
rd decile   6.3    6.2    5.3    7.5    7.8    6.6 
   4
th decile   8.8    8.8    8.1    10.0    10.3    9.5 
   5
th decile   10.1    9.8    9.4    11.0    11.1    10.7 
   6
th decile   10.7    10.5    10.4    11.4    11.6    11.7 
   7
th decile   11.6    11.3    11.9    12.3    12.5    13.2 
   8
th decile   12.9    12.8    13.8    13.5    13.8    15.1 
   9
th decile   14.7    14.5    16.1    15.3    15.5    17.4 
 10
th decile   24.6    22.2    24.7    26.3    25.0    27.9 
 Total   15.6    14.5    16.0    16.8    16.3    18.1 
  Top 1%   35.9    30.8    32.7    39.5    37.4    38.2 
  Top 0.1%   41.6    35.1    36.5    45.6    42.5    42.0 
  Top 0.01%   44.0    36.0    38.3    47.3    42.8    43.5 
  Top 0.001%   45.1    35.7    39.8    48.3    43.7    44.3 
Gross income
1)
as percentage of              
taxable gross income
as percentage of              
gross income plus capital gains
Assessed income tax liability
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.
Source: Income tax statistics 1992-1998; own calculations.
 
 
5  Net vs. Gross Income Concentration 
We are now in a position to estimate the impact of the income tax on the disposable income of Ger-
man taxpayers. Table 12 presents the pre-tax and after-tax distribution of income. Its left hand side 
portrays the distribution of gross income, including capital gains. The right hand side presents results 
concerning gross income including capital gains minus tax liability. We now take capital gains into 
account because they are subject to taxation and neglecting them would seriously distort results. 
The only decile of the distribution for which its share in terms of gross income is larger than in terms 
of net income is the top one. While the top decile received 33.8 % of total gross income in 1998, it 
only received 30.5 % of total net income in that year. Much of this difference is due to the relatively 
heavy taxation of very high incomes. While 12.2 % of total gross income accrues to the top percentile, 











Income fractiles 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998
  1
st - 5
th decile   21,2    21,8    20,5    22,9    23,4    22,5 
  6
th - 9
th decile   46,6    46,9    45,6    48,2    48,0    47,0 
  10
th decile   32,2    31,3    33,8    28,9    28,6    30,5 
 Total   100,0    100,0    100,0    100,0    100,0    100,0 
  Top 1%   10,7    9,8    12,2    8,3    8,0    9,9 
  Top 0.1%   4,3    3,8    5,6    3,1    3,0    4,4 
  Top 0.01%   1,7    1,6    2,5    1,2    1,3    2,0 
  Top 0.001%   0,5    0,6    0,9    0,4    0,5    0,6 
 Gini coefficient
3)   0,4349    0,4219    0,4491    0,3991    0,4033    0,4109 
Net income




1)                        
plus capital gains
structure in %
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.-             
2) Gross income less assessed income tax liability, disregarding other direct taxes on household income 
or wealth, social security contributions and other charges levied by public authorities.- 3) Negative 
income = 0.
Source: Income tax statistics 1992-1998; own calculations.
 
 
Additional hints on the equalizing impact of the German income tax can be derived from Table 13. 
The average member of the top percentile receives about eleven times as much gross income as the 
average German taxpayer; however, in terms of net incomes the ratio is only 9:1. The equalization 
effect due to the income tax is stronger for the economic elite. As shown by Table 13, the average 
gross income of the economic elite is almost 660 times larger than the average income of all taxpay-
ers; however, in terms of net incomes the ratio is only 470:1. Referring to the typical German blue-
collar worker’s household income – measured by the average of the 4
th decile – the net income of the 




  Average gross income and net income plus capital gains 1992-1998 
Income fractiles 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998
   1
st decile   0,3    0,4    0,2    1    1    1    0,3    0,3  -  0,2    1    1  -  1 
   2
nd decile   8,3    10,2    10,6    27    30    29    8,0    9,9    10,4    31    34    33 
   3
rd decile   14,6    16,7    17,6    47    49    48    13,7    15,7    16,7    53    54    54 
   4
th decile   19,3    21,6    22,8    63    64    61    17,6    19,7    21,0    68    68    67 
   5
th decile   23,1    25,6    27,1    75    76    73    20,8    23,0    24,5    80    80    79 
   6
th decile   26,9    29,7    31,5    88    88    85    24,1    26,6    28,2    93    92    91 
   7
th decile   31,5    34,9    37,1    103    103    100    27,9    30,9    32,7    107    107    105 
   8
th decile   37,8    41,9    44,8    123    124    121    32,9    36,5    38,6    127    126    124 
   9
th decile   47,2    52,3    56,4    153    155    152    40,2    44,7    47,3    155    155    152 
 10
th decile   98,5    105,0    122,8    320    310    331    74,2    81,7    92,4    286    283    297 
 Total   30,8    33,8    37,1    100    100    100    26,0    28,9    31,2    100    100    100 
  90%-95%   60,7    67,1    73,5    197    198    198    50,4    56,0    59,8    194    194    192 
  95%-99%   89,7    97,6    110,0    292    289    297    70,8    78,2    85,5    273    270    274 
  Top 1%   322,9    323,9    420,4   1 050    958   1 133    207,1    224,1    283,0    797    775    908 
  99.0%-99.9%   220,7    223,1    275,2    717    660    742    149,4    160,2    192,7    575    554    618 
  Top 0.1%  1 242,6   1 230,6   1 727,5   4 040   3 639   4 657    726,0    798,6   1 096,1   2 796   2 763   3 517 
  99.90%-99.99%   868,1    818,1   1 172,3   2 822   2 419   3 161    519,7    536,0    756,7   2 001   1 854   2 428 
  Top 0.01%  4 614,1   4 943,4   6 726,0   15 000   14 617   18 134   2 582,6   3 161,6   4 152,0   9 945   10 938   13 324 
  99.990%-99.999%  3 517,7   3 555,8   4 766,3   11 436   10 514   12 850   1 986,9   2 266,7   2 983,0   7 652   7 842   9 573 




mean = 100 1 000 Euro
Average net income
2) plus capital gains Average gross income
1) plus capital gains
mean = 100
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Gross income less assessed income tax liability, disregarding other direct taxes on 
household income or wealth, social security contributions and other charges levied by public authorities.
Source: Income tax statistics 1992-1998; own calculations.
 
 
6 Concluding  Remarks 
Issues of income inequality, income concentration, and governmental redistribution are again at the 
forefront of both policy and scientific debate. The current paper has provided an empirical analysis of 
the distribution and taxation of income in Germany, based on individual tax returns data for the 1990s. 
The great advantage of our data source is that it enables one to investigate the upper tail of the income 
distribution on the basis of relatively complete and reliable data. Since all German taxpayers that be-
long to the top percentile of the income distribution are included in our data set, we can provide a 
picture of income concentration and effective tax progressivity that is much more precise that the one 
obtained from previous studies, based on household surveys. For the first time, the top 0.001 % fractile 
of the income distribution, the economic elite of Germany, has been thoroughly investigated. 
Our empirical analysis has yielded several new insights. Germany turns out to be a country with a very 
strong concentration of market incomes. Roughly, a typical household representing the German eco-
nomic elite earns as much as one thousand worker households – a village or a small town - can earn 
together. This contrasts with the popular view of contemporary Germany as a relatively egalitarian 
society. 
Also, the rich are not only different from the rest of us because they have more money. The composi-
tion of income according to its sources is very different for the top of the income hierarchy and the rest 
of the German population. Wages and salaries are by far the quantitatively most important income 
source for the 99 % poorest part of the taxpayer population. This pattern starts to change at the top  
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percentile of the income distribution. In that group, the weight of wages and salaries rapidly dimin-
ishes with increasing income. Strikingly, only 1 % of the households that belong to the German eco-
nomic elite can be identified as managers. The rest of it is, by and large, formed by entrepreneurs and 
rentiers. Interestingly, the predominance of capitalists within top income groups seems to be much 
stronger in Germany than in the US or even France. 
The study of economic elites has hitherto been largely neglected by the literature, partly because there 
is no straightforward access to suitable data.15 However, recent investigations suggest – and ours con-
firms – that even in contemporary welfare states, economic elites not only exist but dispose of an enor-
mous economic power, measured in terms of income relative to ordinary people’s income. Thus, elites 
constitute an important ingredient of contemporary economic systems, one that deserves enhanced 
research efforts. Specifically, exploring the income composition of elites may contribute to a better 
understanding of the determinants of economic success and therefore of the chances of upward mobil-
ity in our societies. A deeper knowledge of economic elites may also provide hints about the intensity 
and direction of forces that those groups can exert upon processes of collective decision making; in 
this way, knowledge about elites may help to better predict politico-economic outcomes. 
The current paper has not only shown that in Germany market incomes are more concentrated than 
usually thought. We have also found that, given this type of market outcome, the German income tax 
substantially contributes to reduce economic inequality. In the 1990s, more than half of the total tax 
revenue is contributed by the top decile. Moreover, households with top incomes play their part: the 
effective tax rate rises with income, the more so within the top decile. While the tax rate effectively 
applied to a typical worker household is around 9 %, the one applied to households of the economic 
elite is almost 40 %. Tax progression is real and strong, although definitely not as strong as the statu-
tory tax rates would imply. 
Possibly, we might overestimate the degree of effective tax progressivity in Germany, since our meas-
ure of gross income cannot account for all means of tax avoidance and taxpayers with very high in-
comes might be in a better position to exploit those unobserved avoidance strategies. The apparent 
discrepancy in business and capital incomes reported to the tax authorities compared to the corre-
sponding items in national accounts give some hints on this topic, although several conceptual diffi-
culties and data restrictions hamper a detailed comparison. Still, the magnitude of tax progressivity 
revealed by our analysis is so large that our conclusions would remain valid even if the margins of 
error of our estimates were considerable. 
Specifically, we find that net income is substantially less concentrated than gross income. The Gini 
coefficient drops from 0.45 to 0.41. In terms of net income, the ratio of the average income in the top 
percentile to average income in the bottom half of the income hierarchy is 22:1. In terms of gross in-
come, the ratio is almost 30:1. The ratio of the net income of a member of the elite to that of a typical 
worker household is about 700:1. This is impressive, but much less than 1000:1, which is the ratio in 
terms of gross income. 
                                                      
15   See, however, Slemrod (1994) for an early investigation of top income households in the US.  
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Thus, progressive income taxation turns out to be an effective tool for reducing economic inequality in 
Germany. Interestingly, tax progressivity has partially been rolled back in the years after our period of 
observation, and this process is likely to continue in the near future. Our estimates suggest that rolling 
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Table A 1 
  Gross income, income components and income tax liability according to the income tax statistics 1992 
  million Euro 
Income fractiles mill. Euro % income





   1
st decile  1 000  - 6 070   1 714   4 535    655    477    178   1 881    250    0.2    4.8   2 948.1    0.3    25.0 
   2
nd decile  24 470   1 950    224   15 767    898    578    321   5 855    800    0.6    11.6   2 947.9    8.3    3.3 
   3
rd decile  42 929   2 862    199   28 562   1 439    898    541   10 066   2 684    1.9    17.1   2 947.8    14.6    6.3 
   4
th decile  56 899   2 758    141   42 766   1 325    887    438   10 049   5 033    3.6    21.2   2 947.9    19.3    8.8 
   5
th decile  68 194   2 573    123   55 744   1 276    909    368   8 601   6 874    4.9    24.9   2 947.9    23.1    10.1 
   6
th decile  79 410   3 225    162   66 833   1 432   1 032    399   7 921   8 464    6.0    29.0   2 948.2    26.9    10.7 
   7
th decile  92 968   4 089    177   78 409   1 762   1 287    474   8 709   10 748    7.6    34.3   2 948.0    31.5    11.6 
   8
th decile  111 387   5 375    182   95 570   2 164   1 613    551   8 278   14 382    10.2    41.6   2 947.4    37.8    12.9 
   9
th decile  139 169   8 335    320   121 047   3 050   2 240    810   6 737   20 523    14.5    54.1   2 947.9    47.2    14.7 
  10
th decile  290 383   85 386   5 075   172 962   24 652   18 731   5 921   7 384   71 543    50.6  .   2 947.9    98.5    24.6 
 Total  906 810   110 482   8 317   682 194   38 653   28 653   10 000   75 481   141 303    100.0  .   29 479.0    30.8    15.6 
  90%-95%  89 470   8 157    328   75 368   2 699   1 884    814   3 246   15 161    10.7    69.2   1 474.0    60.7    16.9 
  95%-99%  105 734   22 822    966   73 639   6 241   4 219   2 022   3 032   22 246    15.7    137.0   1 179.2    89.7    21.0 
  Top 1%  95 179   54 406   3 781   23 954   15 712   12 627   3 085   1 106   34 136    24.2  .    294.8    322.9    35.9 
  99.0%-99.9%  58 549   29 966   1 764   19 930   7 729   5 679   2 050    924   18 906    13.4    480.5    265.3    220.7    32.3 
  Top 0.1%  36 629   24 440   2 017   4 024   7 983   6 949   1 035    182   15 230    10.8  .    29.5   1 242.6    41.6 
  99.90%-99.99%  23 032   14 512   1 363   3 409   4 951   4 160    791    159   9 243    6.5   2 017.9    26.5    868.1    40.1 
  Top 0.01%  13 598   9 928    654    615   3 032   2 789    243    23   5 987    4.2  .    2.9   4 614.1    44.0 
  99.990%-99.999%  9 333   6 581    517    546   2 185   1 977    209    20   4 061    2.9   7 627.0    2.7   3 517.7    43.5 









































1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
Quelle: Berechnungen mit dem Einkommensteuer-Simulationsmodell des DIW Berlin.
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business enterprise, from self-employed activities (professional services), 
plus tax reliefs, plus allowance for capital gains from business activity, plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 3) Taxable wage income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments, 
plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 4) Taxable income from investments (exclusive income from business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance and taxable capital gains from private investments (solely 
speculation gains).- 5) Taxable income from renting and leasing, plus higher losses from renting and leasing.- 6) Taxable pensions from former employments, taxable share of life annuity funds (mere interest portion of the 
annuity payment), alimonies between separated and divorced spouses, plus allowance for taxable pensions from former employments, plus non-taxable share of life annuity funds (estimated), plus non-taxable replacement 
amounts from insurances for loss of earned income (e.g. benefits from unemployment or health insurance), as far as relevant for taxation with progression ("Progressionsvorbehalt").- 7) Percentile, relating to adjusted gross 
income.- 8) Married couples are counted as one taxpayer due to joint assessment (taxation with full income splitting).
Source: Income tax statistics 1992; own calculations.
 
 
Table A 2 
Taxable gross income, income components and income tax liability according to the income tax statistics 1992 
  million Euro 






   1
st decile -  857  - 6 148   1 631   4 518  -  152    477  -  629    925    250    0.2    4.8   2 948.1  -  0.3  -  29.1 
   2
nd decile  20 115   1 879    156   15 611    725    578    148   1 900    800    0.6    11.6   2 947.9    6.8    4.0 
   3
rd decile  35 768   2 790    133   28 354   1 233    898    335   3 390   2 684    1.9    17.1   2 947.8    12.1    7.5 
   4
th decile  50 175   2 710    103   42 529   1 096    887    209   3 841   5 033    3.6    21.2   2 947.9    17.0    10.0 
   5
th decile  62 534   2 536    96   55 479    974    909    65   3 545   6 874    4.9    24.9   2 947.9    21.2    11.0 
   6
th decile  74 128   3 178    127   66 546   1 009   1 032  -  23   3 395   8 464    6.0    29.0   2 948.2    25.1    11.4 
   7
th decile  87 563   4 030    134   78 132   1 098   1 287  -  189   4 302   10 748    7.6    34.3   2 948.0    29.7    12.3 
   8
th decile  106 195   5 317    150   95 243   1 157   1 613  -  457   4 479   14 382    10.2    41.6   2 947.4    36.0    13.5 
   9
th decile  134 012   8 236    265   120 662   1 295   2 240  -  945   3 819   20 523    14.5    54.1   2 947.9    45.5    15.3 
  10
th decile  271 778   84 349   4 908   172 129   10 809   18 731  - 7 922   4 491   71 543    50.6  .   2 947.9    92.2    26.3 
 Total  841 412   108 877   7 703   679 204   19 244   28 653  - 9 409   34 086   141 303    100.0  .   29 479.0    28.5    16.8 
  90%-95%  85 981   8 061    286   75 087    899   1 884  -  986   1 936   15 161    10.7    69.2   1 474.0    58.3    17.6 
  95%-99%  99 417   22 574    887   73 250   1 734   4 219  - 2 485   1 860   22 246    15.7    137.0   1 179.2    84.3    22.4 
  Top 1%  86 380   53 714   3 735   23 793   8 177   12 627  - 4 451    696   34 136    24.2  .    294.8    293.0    39.5 
  99.0%-99.9%  53 004   29 683   1 723   19 824   2 919   5 679  - 2 760    578   18 906    13.4    480.5    265.3    199.8    35.7 
  Top 0.1%  33 376   24 032   2 012   3 969   5 258   6 949  - 1 691    118   15 230    10.8  .    29.5   1 132.2    45.6 
  99.90%-99.99%  20 718   14 308   1 358   3 379   2 929   4 160  - 1 231    102   9 243    6.5   2 017.9    26.5    780.9    44.6 
  Top 0.01%  12 658   9 724    654    589   2 329   2 789  -  460    16   5 987    4.2  .    2.9   4 295.1    47.3 
  99.990%-99.999%  8 670   6 476    517    522   1 657   1 977  -  319    14   4 061    2.9   7 627.0    2.7   3 268.0    46.8 
  Top 0.001%  3 988   3 247    137    67    671    812  -  141    2   1 926    1.4  .    0.3   13 563.6    48.3 
Tax-
payers







































1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
Quelle: Berechnungen mit dem Einkommensteuer-Simulationsmodell des DIW Berlin.
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics.- 3) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business 
enterprise, from self-employed activities (professional services).- 4) Taxable wage income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments.- 5) Taxable income from investments 
(exclusive income from business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance and taxable capital gains from private investments (solely speculation gains).- 6) Taxable income from renting and leasing.- 7) Taxable 
pensions from former employments, taxable share of life annuity funds (mere interest portion of the annuity payment), alimonies between separated and divorced spouses.- 8) Percentile, relating to adjusted gross income.-        
9) Married couples are counted as one taxpayer due to joint assessment (taxation with full income splitting).- 10) Relating to taxable income.





Table A 3 
  Gross income, income components and income tax liability according to the income tax statistics 1995 
  million Euro 
Income fractiles mill. Euro % income





   1
st decile  1 159  - 8 227   1 737   5 672   1 338    989    350   2 377    230    0.2    6.2   2 967.9    0.4    19.8 
   2
nd decile  30 278   2 859    419   18 413   1 293    862    431   7 712    836    0.6    13.7   2 967.4    10.2    2.8 
   3
rd decile  49 642   3 387    320   32 312   1 741   1 127    614   12 203   3 101    2.1    19.3   2 967.8    16.7    6.2 
   4
th decile  64 002   3 145    244   47 234   1 702   1 177    525   11 921   5 630    3.9    23.5   2 967.7    21.6    8.8 
   5
th decile  75 852   3 097    204   60 106   1 771   1 283    487   10 879   7 457    5.1    27.5   2 967.4    25.6    9.8 
   6
th decile  88 177   3 653    215   71 510   2 095   1 535    560   10 919   9 227    6.3    31.9   2 967.8    29.7    10.5 
   7
th decile  103 488   4 884    262   84 023   2 636   1 967    669   11 945   11 740    8.1    37.9   2 967.4    34.9    11.3 
   8
th decile  124 272   6 265    299   103 705   3 137   2 352    785   11 164   15 858    10.9    46.1   2 967.6    41.9    12.8 
   9
th decile  155 202   9 423    427   132 322   4 291   3 188   1 103   9 167   22 558    15.5    60.0   2 967.7    52.3    14.5 
  10
th decile  311 543   84 325   4 699   191 147   26 282   18 962   7 320   9 789   69 182    47.4  .   2 967.6    105.0    22.2 
 Total 1 003 615   112 811   8 827   746 444   46 285   33 442   12 844   98 075   145 820    100.0  .   29 676.3    33.8    14.5 
  90%-95%  99 597   8 888    351   82 726   3 698   2 625   1 074   4 284   16 506    11.3    76.3   1 483.8    67.1    16.6 
  95%-99%  115 831   23 263    960   81 165   7 341   4 840   2 501   4 063   23 052    15.8    144.4   1 187.0    97.6    19.9 
  Top 1%  96 115   52 174   3 388   27 257   15 243   11 498   3 745   1 441   29 624    20.3  .    296.8    323.9    30.8 
  99.0%-99.9%  59 595   27 818   1 355   22 745   7 806   5 370   2 437   1 226   16 803    11.5    467.2    267.1    223.1    28.2 
  Top 0.1%  36 520   24 356   2 034   4 512   7 436   6 128   1 308    216   12 822    8.8  .    29.7   1 230.6    35.1 
  99.90%-99.99%  21 850   13 232   1 123   3 914   4 519   3 542    977    185   7 534    5.2   1 898.1    26.7    818.1    34.5 
  Top 0.01%  14 670   11 124    910    598   2 917   2 586    332    31   5 288    3.6  .    3.0   4 943.4    36.0 
  99.990%-99.999%  9 499   6 900    745    535   2 036   1 773    263    28   3 444    2.4   8 053.9    2.7   3 555.8    36.3 
  Top 0.001%  5 170   4 224    166    62    881    812    69    2   1 844    1.3  .    0.3   17 466.6    35.7 
Tax-
payers





































1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
Quelle: Berechnungen mit dem Einkommensteuer-Simulationsmodell des DIW Berlin.
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business enterprise, from self-employed activities (professional services), 
plus tax reliefs, plus allowance for capital gains from business activity, plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 3) Taxable wage income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments, 
plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 4) Taxable income from investments (exclusive income from business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance and taxable capital gains from private investments (solely 
speculation gains).- 5) Taxable income from renting and leasing, plus higher losses from renting and leasing.- 6) Taxable pensions from former employments, taxable share of life annuity funds (mere interest portion of the 
annuity payment), alimonies between separated and divorced spouses, plus allowance for taxable pensions from former employments, plus non-taxable share of life annuity funds (estimated), plus non-taxable replacement 
amounts from insurances for loss of earned income (e.g. benefits from unemployment or health insurance), as far as relevant for taxation with progression ("Progressionsvorbehalt").- 7) Percentile, relating to adjusted gross 
income.- 8) Married couples are counted as one taxpayer due to joint assessment (taxation with full income splitting).
Source: Income tax statistics 1995; own calculations.
 
 
Table A 4 
Taxable gross income, income components and income tax liability according to the income tax statistics 1995 
  million Euro 






   1
st decile - 2 267  - 8 451   1 541   5 650  -  507    370  -  877   1 041    230    0.2    6.2   2 967.9  -  0.8  -  10.1 
   2
nd decile  23 375   2 657    229   18 313    347    229    118   2 059    836    0.6    13.7   2 967.4    7.9    3.6 
   3
rd decile  39 720   3 212    166   32 154    561    319    243   3 792   3 101    2.1    19.3   2 967.8    13.4    7.8 
   4
th decile  54 838   3 014    141   47 064    479    333    146   4 280   5 630    3.9    23.5   2 967.7    18.5    10.3 
   5
th decile  67 412   2 979    118   59 903    329    339  -  10   4 201   7 457    5.1    27.5   2 967.4    22.7    11.1 
   6
th decile  79 593   3 524    132   71 291    319    425  -  106   4 459   9 227    6.3    31.9   2 967.8    26.8    11.6 
   7
th decile  94 113   4 712    163   83 781    166    588  -  422   5 454   11 740    8.1    37.9   2 967.4    31.7    12.5 
   8
th decile  115 014   6 056    197   103 421  -  54    738  -  792   5 591   15 858    10.9    46.1   2 967.6    38.8    13.8 
   9
th decile  145 415   9 109    311   131 968  -  536   1 084  - 1 621   4 876   22 558    15.5    60.0   2 967.7    49.0    15.5 
  10
th decile  276 182   81 673   4 417   190 196  - 1 365   14 068  - 15 434   5 677   69 182    47.4  .   2 967.6    93.1    25.0 
 Total  893 395   108 488   7 413   743 740  -  262   18 494  - 18 756   41 429   145 820    100.0  .   29 676.3    30.1    16.3 
  90%-95%  92 767   8 605    267   82 414  -  670   1 026  - 1 697   2 419   16 506    11.3    76.3   1 483.8    62.5    17.8 
  95%-99%  104 110   22 562    823   80 756  - 1 575   2 621  - 4 197   2 366   23 052    15.8    144.4   1 187.0    87.7    22.1 
  Top 1%  79 304   50 507   3 327   27 026    880   10 420  - 9 540    892   29 624    20.3  .    296.8    267.2    37.4 
  99.0%-99.9%  49 114   27 094   1 305   22 592  - 1 323   4 435  - 5 758    752   16 803    11.5    467.2    267.1    183.9    34.2 
  Top 0.1%  30 190   23 413   2 021   4 434   2 203   5 985  - 3 782    140   12 822    8.8  .    29.7   1 017.3    42.5 
  99.90%-99.99%  17 839   12 938   1 116   3 852    929   3 415  - 2 486    120   7 534    5.2   1 898.1    26.7    667.9    42.2 
  Top 0.01%  12 352   10 475    905    582   1 274   2 571  - 1 297    21   5 288    3.6  .    3.0   4 162.3    42.8 
  99.990%-99.999%  8 133   6 723    740    521    870   1 760  -  890    19   3 444    2.4   8 053.9    2.7   3 044.5    42.3 










































1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
Quelle: Berechnungen mit dem Einkommensteuer-Simulationsmodell des DIW Berlin.
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics.- 3) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business 
enterprise, from self-employed activities (professional services).- 4) Taxable wage income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments.- 5) Taxable income from investments 
(exclusive income from business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance and taxable capital gains from private investments (solely speculation gains).- 6) Taxable income from renting and leasing.- 7) Taxable 
pensions from former employments, taxable share of life annuity funds (mere interest portion of the annuity payment), alimonies between separated and divorced spouses.- 8) Percentile, relating to adjusted gross income.-        
9) Married couples are counted as one taxpayer due to joint assessment (taxation with full income splitting).- 10) Relating to taxable income.





Table A 5 
  Gross income, income components and income tax liability according to the income tax statistics 1998 
  million Euro 
Income fractiles mill. Euro % income





   1
st decile   630  - 5 317   5 043   3 382   1 840   1 524    315    725   1 304    0.8    5.6   2 867.3    0.2    207.1 
   2
nd decile  30 399   3 793    821   18 121   1 712   1 297    415   6 773    492    0.3    14.2   2 867.3    10.6    1.6 
   3
rd decile  50 600   4 365    713   33 007   2 210   1 577    633   11 017   2 703    1.6    20.3   2 867.4    17.6    5.3 
   4
th decile  65 375   4 038    503   47 382   2 254   1 705    548   11 701   5 294    3.1    24.8   2 867.2    22.8    8.1 
   5
th decile  77 632   3 925    445   59 920   2 386   1 886    501   11 401   7 311    4.3    29.0   2 867.4    27.1    9.4 
   6
th decile  90 336   4 556    456   70 871   2 864   2 235    629   12 046   9 426    5.5    33.9   2 867.3    31.5    10.4 
   7
th decile  106 443   6 002    538   83 250   3 519   2 731    788   13 672   12 617    7.4    40.3   2 867.2    37.1    11.9 
   8
th decile  128 360   7 889    720   103 191   4 133   3 234    899   13 146   17 669    10.4    49.2   2 867.3    44.8    13.8 
   9
th decile  161 609   11 961    995   132 587   5 607   4 292   1 314   11 454   26 082    15.3    64.9   2 867.3    56.4    16.1 
  10
th decile  352 126   107 281   19 056   198 678   32 671   24 651   8 020   13 496   87 098    51.2  .   2 867.3    122.8    24.7 
 Total 1 063 510   148 494   29 290   750 390   59 196   45 133   14 063   105 430   169 997    100.0  .   28 672.9    37.1    16.0 
  90%-95%  105 435   11 194   1 048   83 959   4 615   3 354   1 260   5 668   19 644    11.6    83.6   1 433.7    73.5    18.6 
  95%-99%  126 145   29 232   3 121   82 622   8 814   5 966   2 848   5 477   28 063    16.5    162.7   1 146.9    110.0    22.2 
  Top 1%  120 546   66 855   14 888   32 097   19 243   15 331   3 912   2 351   39 391    23.2  .    286.7    420.4    32.7 
  99.0%-99.9%  71 015   34 216   6 607   25 588   9 312   6 727   2 585   1 898   21 288    12.5    551.9    258.1    275.2    30.0 
  Top 0.1%  49 531   32 639   8 280   6 510   9 930   8 604   1 327    453   18 103    10.6  .    28.7   1 727.5    36.5 
  99.90%-99.99%  30 251   18 725   5 931   5 409   5 788   4 784   1 004    330   10 725    6.3   2 338.8    25.8   1 172.3    35.5 
  Top 0.01%  19 280   13 914   2 349   1 101   4 142   3 820    323    123   7 378    4.3  .    2.9   6 726.0    38.3 
  99.990%-99.999%  12 299   8 758   1 763    982   2 466   2 250    216    93   4 602    2.7   10 276.7    2.6   4 766.3    37.4 
  Top 0.001%  6 980   5 156    587    119   1 676   1 569    107    30   2 777    1.6  .    0.3   24 406.8    39.8 







































1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
Quelle: Berechnungen mit dem Einkommensteuer-Simulationsmodell des DIW Berlin.
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business enterprise, from self-employed activities (professional services), 
plus tax reliefs, plus allowance for capital gains from business activity, plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 3) Taxable wage income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments, 
plus tax-exempted foreign income.- 4) Taxable income from investments (exclusive income from business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance and taxable capital gains from private investments (solely 
speculation gains).- 5) Taxable income from renting and leasing, plus higher losses from renting and leasing.- 6) Taxable pensions from former employments, taxable share of life annuity funds (mere interest portion of the 
annuity payment), alimonies between separated and divorced spouses, plus allowance for taxable pensions from former employments, plus non-taxable share of life annuity funds (estimated), plus non-taxable replacement 
amounts from insurances for loss of earned income (e.g. benefits from unemployment or health insurance), as far as relevant for taxation with progression ("Progressionsvorbehalt").- 7) Percentile, relating to adjusted gross 
income.- 8) Married couples are counted as one taxpayer due to joint assessment (taxation with full income splitting).
Source: Income tax statistics 1998; own calculations.
 
 
Table A 6 
Taxable gross income, income components and income tax liability according to the income tax statistics 1998 
  million Euro 






   1
st decile - 3 331  - 5 467   4 920   3 380  -  316    528  -  844  -  927   1 304    0.8    5.6   2 867.3  -  1.2  -  39.2 
   2
nd decile  23 234   3 578    619   18 110    276    269    6   1 271    492    0.3    14.2   2 867.3    8.1    2.1 
   3
rd decile  40 807   4 164    540   32 988    595    354    241   3 061   2 703    1.6    20.3   2 867.4    14.2    6.6 
   4
th decile  55 830   3 891    390   47 360    478    382    96   4 100   5 294    3.1    24.8   2 867.2    19.5    9.5 
   5
th decile  68 539   3 779    341   59 895    400    411  -  10   4 465   7 311    4.3    29.0   2 867.4    23.9    10.7 
   6
th decile  80 720   4 396    365   70 836    396    517  -  121   5 092   9 426    5.5    33.9   2 867.3    28.2    11.7 
   7
th decile  95 706   5 806    440   83 187    316    713  -  397   6 398   12 617    7.4    40.3   2 867.2    33.4    13.2 
   8
th decile  117 332   7 606    601   103 076    50    912  -  862   6 600   17 669    10.4    49.2   2 867.3    40.9    15.1 
   9
th decile  149 690   11 561    880   132 326  -  217   1 409  - 1 626   6 020   26 082    15.3    64.9   2 867.3    52.2    17.4 
  10
th decile  312 226   103 718   18 711   197 463   3 728   17 829  - 14 100   7 317   87 098    51.2  .   2 867.3    108.9    27.9 
 Total  940 752   143 031   27 806   748 621   5 705   23 322  - 17 617   43 396   169 997    100.0  .   28 672.9    32.8    18.1 
  90%-95%  97 057   10 802    953   83 609  -  481   1 356  - 1 837   3 126   19 644    11.6    83.6   1 433.7    67.7    20.2 
  95%-99%  112 147   28 216   2 958   82 073  - 1 097   3 258  - 4 355   2 956   28 063    16.5    162.7   1 146.9    97.8    25.0 
  Top 1%  103 022   64 700   14 800   31 781   5 306   13 215  - 7 908   1 234   39 391    23.2  .    286.7    359.3    38.2 
  99.0%-99.9%  59 898   33 264   6 529   25 371    258   5 291  - 5 033   1 005   21 288    12.5    551.9    258.1    232.1    35.5 
  Top 0.1%  43 124   31 436   8 271   6 410   5 049   7 924  - 2 875    229   18 103    10.6  .    28.7   1 504.0    42.0 
  99.90%-99.99%  26 147   18 298   5 922   5 335   2 334   4 363  - 2 029    181   10 725    6.3   2 338.8    25.8   1 013.2    41.0 
  Top 0.01%  16 977   13 138   2 348   1 075   2 715   3 561  -  846    49   7 378    4.3  .    2.9   5 922.6    43.5 
  99.990%-99.999%  10 715   8 296   1 762    959   1 423   2 089  -  666    38   4 602    2.7   10 276.7    2.6   4 152.4    42.9 
  Top 0.001%  6 262   4 843    587    116   1 292   1 472  -  180    11   2 777    1.6  .    0.3   21 894.2    44.3 
Tax-
payers







































1) Steuerlich zu berücksichtigende Kinder, für die Kinderfreibeträge oder Kindergeld gewährt wird. 
Quelle: Berechnungen mit dem Einkommensteuer-Simulationsmodell des DIW Berlin.
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics.- 3) Taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from business 
enterprise, from self-employed activities (professional services).- 4) Taxable wage income (before deduction of allowable expenses), minus taxable pensions from former employments.- 5) Taxable income from investments 
(exclusive income from business activities), inclusive receipts below the savers allowance and taxable capital gains from private investments (solely speculation gains).- 6) Taxable income from renting and leasing.- 7) Taxable 
pensions from former employments, taxable share of life annuity funds (mere interest portion of the annuity payment), alimonies between separated and divorced spouses.- 8) Percentile, relating to adjusted gross income.-        
9) Married couples are counted as one taxpayer due to joint assessment (taxation with full income splitting).- 10) Relating to taxable income.





Table A 7 
  Taxpayers with higher losses from renting and leasing according to the income tax statistics 1995-1998 
Income fractiles 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998
  1
st - 5
th decile   0.7      1.1      1.2      0.9      1.3      1.3   
  6
th - 9
th decile   2.9      4.0      4.5      0.9      1.3      1.4   
 10
th decile   16.3      20.2      21.4      4.9      7.4      6.6   
 Total   3.1      4.2      4.6      2.2      3.2      3.1   
  Top 1%   42.0      51.0      49.4      8.2      14.3      11.2   
  Top 0.1%   48.6      58.5      55.5      7.9      14.8      10.2   
  Top 0.01%   47.2      56.8      55.3      5.4      11.8      6.9   
  Top 0.001%   50.0      63.0      59.8      4.3      9.5      4.5   
Gross income
1)
Tax payers with higher losses from 
renting and leasing
1 000
Higher losses from renting and leasing
2) 
as percentage of gross income
1)
%
1) Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as included in income tax statistics, less capital gains.- 2) Losses of at least 5,000 
Euro from direct investments in real estate and at least 2,500 Euro from shareholdings (closed property funds, property 
developer partnerships etc.).
Source: Income tax statistics 1992-1998; own calculations.
 
 